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ABSTRACT 
The field of advanced materials (AM) is expected to experience considerable growth and has the potential to 
make a substantial impact on numerous industries, markets and applications. Much like IT and biotech 
before it, advanced materials face the many commercialization challenges of revolutionary, generic 
technologies. AM ventures face the additional challenge of competing with established substitutes. Though 
there has been limited prior research on AM commercialization, the specific challenges facing AM firms at 
the crossroads of academia and industry have not been previously addressed. 
 
This study focuses on the challenges facing AM university spin-outs (USOs).   The evolution of their 
business models is examined to investigate how the ventures navigate encountered challenges in order to 
create a resource base, create value for co-producers and customers, and attempt to capture value for 
themselves. A dataset of Cambridge-affiliated AM companies is used to frame and position six case studies 
of AM spin-outs in various stages of value creation. These cases are analyzed to gain insight into the main 
challenges the companies have encountered and solutions they have attempted. This evidence and analysis 
are used to refine the proposed conceptual framework. 
 
This research highlights the importance for AM USOs of creating and developing a business model that 
enables them to select an appropriate market and application, identify and attract appropriate co-producers, 
and build and leverage both internal and external resources in creative ways  in order to generate value.  
Successful strategies that have been identified through the case studies include creating a partner-focused 
business model, early market identification, demonstrating the innovation in a system, and altering target 
market or market position to one were complementary assets are either available or unnecessary.  
 
Key words: Advanced materials, open-systems theory, value creation, university spin-outs, academic 
entrepreneurship.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Advanced materials (AM) technologies1  are poised to have a significant impact on the economy, a broad 
range of markets and applications, and the environment. They have been called the third wave of generic, 
revolutionary innovation, the first waves being IT and biotech respectively (OECD, 1998; Oliver, 1999).  
However, in contrast to the first two waves, AM technologies also face the challenge of established 
substitutes in their markets.  
 
Further, the commercialization of these technologies poses significant and unique challenges for a number 
of key agents, including managers, entrepreneurs and policy makers. It has long been recommended by 
national and international policy makers that development in these areas should be encouraged as they will 
become engines of growth in increasingly knowledge-based economies (OECD, 1998; Maine and Garnsey, 
2006). However, in order to make useful decisions in both policy and management, this unique and complex 
sector must first be better understood.   
 
Sustained market and technology risk combined with long lead times often discourages incumbent firms, 
those with adequate resources, from developing and commercializing the more radical materials 
technologies in-house (Maine, 2006).  For this reason among others, many of these innovations come from 
university spin-outs, who often receive significant government funding (Gill, Minshall et al., 2007). 
However, the process of commercializing AM technologies from university spin-outs (USO) has not been 
specifically addressed in theory or literature to date.  
 
Although AM USOs face both market and technological challenges, this paper focuses on the challenges 
they encounter from a market perspective. Both internal and external factors are addressed and an open 
systems approach is used.  By tracing the evolution of business models of case companies as their 
environments and resources change, we can gain insight into the experiences, challenges and creative 
solutions of scientist-entrepreneurs in their journey toward value creation.  Accordingly, this research 
proposes a conceptual framework for qualitative analysis of the value creation cycle of AM USOs, 
including a critical resource-building cycle.  
 
                                                 
1 Advanced materials technologies, in this paper, refer to novel functional materials and/or process innovations which have 
potential to significantly improve cost, performance or both  
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This paper attempts to identify what challenges advanced material university spin-outs face, how they 
endeavor to create value and how their business models evolve in response to these challenges.  
We begin with an overview of literature in relevant areas, including advanced materials, university spin-outs, 
applicable theoretical approaches and value creation. Prior work is used to build a preliminary conceptual 
framework, to be tested and refined through a dataset of advanced material companies connected to the 
University of Cambridge. This dataset is then used to select a set of case study companies which faced 
similar challenges as many of the total sample to provide further insight and refinement of the conceptual 
framework. We conclude with an overview of the final proposed conceptual framework and outcomes for 
theory, practice and policy.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many of the areas of literature that are relevant to frame and analyze the subject matter overlap, as shown in 
figure 1. 
Figure 1-Map of Relevant Literature 
 
 
 
Advanced materials literature provides the first point of inquiry, from which other areas have been 
identified.    
 
2.1 Advanced Materials 
Although there is literature on entrepreneurship, high-tech entrepreneurship and New Technology Based 
Firms (NTBF), there has been little research to date specifically on AM innovation commercialization. The 
NTBF Advanced 
Materials 
High-tech 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship 
Obstacles to Growth 
University 
Spin-outs 
AM Ventures from USOs 
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majority of this work has focused on incumbent firms rather than ventures (Maine and Garnsey, 2007). 
There has been no work found to date exclusively on AM university spin-outs (USO). Research identified is 
summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1-Past Research on Advanced Material Commercialization 
 
Area Key Authors 
Industry level  Hagedoorn & Schakenraad(1991),  
Production volume growth Eager,(1998), Clark (1997),  Maine(2000) 
Established firms producing industrial materials Niosi and Bas (2001), Wield and Roy (1995), 
Hounshell & Smith (1988), Maine (2008), 
Early experiences of advanced materials ventures Niosi (1993), Hagedoorn & Schakenraad (1991), 
Maine & Ashby (2002) 
Advanced materials ventures Maine and Garnsey (2004), Maine and Garnsey (2006) 
Adapted from: (Maine and Garnsey, 2004) 
  
Advanced materials ventures and spin-outs face a number of the same challenges as other high-tech 
ventures; however, they also face distinct technical, management and market challenges that make them 
unique. These are the combination of established substitute products, required process innovations, radical 
technology, up-stream position in the value chain, multiple potential markets, need for complementary 
resources and lack of continuity, observability and trialability (Maine and Garnsey, 2006).  Maine and 
Garnsey use these factors in an influence model of value creation, Figure 2, which emphasizes the 
difficulties of  demonstrating value in a specific application, without which AM ventures cannot reach value 
creation.  
 
Figure 2-Influence Model of Value Creation by AM Ventures 
 
 
Source: (Maine and Garnsey, 2006, p381) 
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This model, which is examined critically and modified later in this paper, demonstrates how these 
challenges influence each other in a complex system. This intricate value creation cycle, combined with 
challenge of finding funding after the stage for which most government research grants are intended, can 
mean the scientist-entrepreneurs must choose to either sell their IP or set up a new firm in order to develop 
and commercialize the business idea themselves. For these reasons “the advanced materials NTBF, with its 
more ambitious value creation goals, also requires strong linkages with providers of complementary 
resources, with investors and the science base” (Maine and Garnsey, 2007, p 4). What these relationships 
provide and lack for the AM ventures is summarized in table 2. 
Table 2-Key Relationships for AM Ventures 
 
Key Relationship with Provides Lacks 
Science Base -link to relevant research/knowledge base 
-funds for ‘blue sky’ research 
-link to market needs 
-funds for commercial oriented research 
Investors -early stage funding (private and seed 
investors) 
-In many cases, later stage funding (VC and 
incumbents) due to high technology and 
market risk 
Co-producers/distributors -access to complementary assets 
(manufacturing, marketing and distribution 
-threat of pre-mature lock-in (negative) 
-Often, necessary willingness to go beyond 
their core competencies, and take on market 
and technology risks 
Summarized from:(Maine and Garnsey, 2007) 
  
Maine and Garnsey (2007) suggest that as AM technologies get closer to market, key relationships, market 
challenges and technology challenges need to be addressed, including prioritization of development 
objectives, strategic balance of short term and long term requirements, alliance building, and sufficient 
fundraising to overcome high development costs and long adoption timelines. 
2.2 University Spin-outs 
 
University spin-outs2 (USOs), a form of academic entrepreneurship (Shane, 2004), are a specific category of 
spin-out and entrepreneurial endeavour, and are often viewed as a subcategory of NTBF (Mustar, Renault et 
al., 2006). In recent years, there has been a growing interest in university spin-outs as a form of technology-
transfer3, a potential source of university income, and this is a concern to policy makers (Lockett and 
Wright, 2005; Minshall and Wicksteed, 2005; Mustar, Renault et al., 2006). Spin-outs have the potential to 
create wealth, but they are also often responsible for the development of important technologies that are 
later acquired by larger companies (Shane, 2004).  
 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this paper, spinning out a company will mean when the technology (or ownership thereof) is transferred 
partly or wholly out of the parent entity. 
3The term research-based spin-out (RBSO) is defined as “the creation of ventures based on the formal and informal transfer of 
technology or knowledge generated by public research organizations” (Mustar et al, 2006, p289) but used interchangeably with 
USO.   
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The importance of university spin-outs (USO)4 is widely acknowledge through the literature, and recently 
their heterogeneity has been recognized (Clarysee, Wright et al., 2005; Minshall and Wicksteed, 2005; 
Mustar, Renault et al., 2006).  USOs exist within a specific environment that has significant impact on the 
challenges they face and how they attempt to overcome them. These include entrepreneur-scientist 
motivations, links to science base, availability of finance and university environment (Druilhe and Garnsey, 
2003).  Other key aspects of USOs are summarized in table 3 below. 
Table 3: Examined aspects of USOs 
Aspect of  University Spin-out    Relevant ideas and authors 
Contrasting motivation for 
creation of traditional spin-
out 
− possession of potentially valuable technology either outside the core 
competencies and/or established markets of the parent (Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom, 2002).   
− technology is valuable but risky and not sufficiently aligned with 
parents core capabilities (Maine, 2006) 
Motivation of create USO 
− self-employment, make an economic contribution, legal vehicles for 
technology development (Clarysee, Wright et al., 2005) 
− desire to bring science to market, desire for wealth, desire for 
independence or career oriented factors (Shane, 2004) 
− -additional objectives of other stakeholders such as University  
(Clarysee, Wright et al., 2005) 
Development of USO 
− overlapping stages and processes before and after spinning out require 
different actions on the part of both the parent and the entrepreneur 
(Clarysee, Wright et al., 2005) 
− development also requires dynamic process of resource acquisition 
and development by to continue create value (Penrose, 1995; Barney, 
2001). 
Theoretical perspectives for 
examination 
− three main perspectives used for viewing USOs: resource-based 
perspective (which can be subdivided into technological, human, 
financial and social resources), business model perspective and 
institutional perspective 
− business model perspective can be combined with the resource-based 
perspective for more dynamic perspective (Mustar, Renault et al., 
2006) 
Although there are a number of theoretical perspectives that have been used to examine USOs, as shown in 
the previous table, many AM USOs are in the very early stages and still unclear on their applications, 
markets and strategies. Business models show how a firm views itself, its resources and its path to market. 
Thus analysis of the business model and evolution thereof is the selected mode of inquiry for this paper. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Also called research-based spin-outs (RBSO) (Mustar, Renault et al., 2006) 
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2.3 Business Models 
 
The business model can be viewed as a design, demonstrating how the firms view themselves and their 
opportunities within their environments. This includes strategic relationships, markets, value chain position, 
value proposition, revenue model, strategy (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002) and exploitation of 
resources to create value. But although selecting an appropriate business model is important, the evolution 
of that business model, as attempts are made to operationalize it, is also essential in creating and capturing 
maximum value as “the business models of new ventures are altered as entrepreneurs improve their 
knowledge of resources and opportunities” (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2003). 
 
The relevant ideas and authors regarding business models are summarized in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Relevant ideas and authors regarding business models 
 Business Models: Relevant ideas and authors 
Definition 
− is not well-defined, often linked to strategy and exploitation of resources or 
opportunities (Amit and Zott, 2000; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002)  
− some ambiguity between the business model and strategy (Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002) 
Function 
− “creates a heuristic logic that connects technical potential with the realization of 
economic value” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002, p 529) 
− may “constrain the subsequent search for new, alternative models for other 
technologies later on” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002, p529) 
− with creativity, can assist in mobilizing resources in unusual ways (Hugo and 
Garnsey, 2004). 
− determines a favorable position in the value chain (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002; Hugo and Garnsey, 2004) 
Selection 
− Emergence of “science-based” businesses have created a new model attempting to 
use existing science, advance scientific knowledge and capture value (Pisano, 
2006) 
− Successful models for AM ventures include both possible near market and future 
applications,  innovative organizational structures, and ability to attract partners and 
investment (Maine, 2006) 
− USO business model often determined by availability of resources which may not 
fit with market opportunities (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2003) 
 
For this paper, business model will refer to the architecture, meaning the underlying fundamental design, of 
a company’s activities and transactions leading to value creation, and ultimately value capture. The 
business model is critically important to AM USOs because their choice of model will help to identify 
appropriate resource utilization, business strategy and position in the value chain well as having a great 
impact on ability to react to challenges and opportunities in the future.  It must take into consideration the 
requirements of the various stakeholders including the entrepreneur, the parent/university, venture 
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capitalists and customers. However, these further complicate business model selection and the path to value 
creation. 
2.4 Relevant Theoretical Perspectives 
 
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that can be used to examine USOs. Resource-based theory 
(RBT) is used in a number of studies as an appropriate way to view new ventures (Penrose, 1995; Mustar, 
Renault et al., 2006). As the literature and preliminary case evidence indicate, many tangible and intangible 
inputs can be used in different ways to create value for the firm (Wernerfelt, 1997; Barney, 2001; Mustar, 
Renault et al., 2006)  However, if used incorrectly or inexpertly, factors or inputs that could otherwise be 
viewed as a resource will not contribute to value creation.  For example, a large company manager with 
relationship management skills but no experience in a start-up may be detrimental to the firm, rather than 
serving as a resource. In this paper, resources will be defined as any factor that can be used or leveraged to 
create value for the firm.  
 
As Penrose explains “in order to focus attention on the crucial role of a firm’s ‘inherited’ resources, the 
environment is treated, in the first instance, as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind of the possibilities and 
restrictions with which he is confronted, for it is, after all, such an ‘image’ which in fact determines a man’s 
behavior” (Penrose, 1997).  However, Penrose’s original argument also demonstrated that the external 
environment should not be ignored because “growth is governed by a creative and dynamic interaction 
between the firm’s productive resources and its market opportunities” (Penrose, 1960, p1). For this reason, 
it appears an approach that incorporates both internal and external environment is appropriate.  
 
Some of the key authors in evolutionary theory and RBT put forth ideas that implicitly or explicitly link the 
two perspectives (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1997; Garnsey and Leong, 2007).  When examining a typical 
value chain of a high-tech venture, such as that in Figure 3, it becomes apparent that neither view is 
complete. Although successful value creation is highly dependent on the AM USO’s exploitation of their 
own resources, it is also heavily influenced by its position in the value chain and how it actively engages 
with its environment.   
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Figure 3-Example Value Chain of High-tech Venture 
 
Design
House
Manufacturing  
licensee
Distributor
OEM
Critical 
Components
Pilot 
production
Materials
R &D
services
Suppliers’
suppliers
Suppliers
Customers Customers’customers
In- house 
prototyping
/and or pilot plant
Final
customer
Scaled up
production
Batch,  or small 
run production.
 
Source: (Garnsey, 2007) 
For example, a new firm may have to leverage its own resources or its patents in order to gain access to the 
manufacturing capabilities of a partner firm. This creates a complex web of interactions which can be 
planned, unplanned, internal or external to the firm.  An open systems model enables the boundaries of the 
firm to be shown while still describing the complex in/out flow of resources, impact of relationships and 
technological issues (McCarthy, 2003).  Because of these blurred boundaries and complex relationships 
between parties, value creation in an open systems environment becomes complicated. 
2.5 Value Creation 
 
It can be argued that the creation (and ultimately the capture) of value, is the goal of any venture. But 
between many schools of thought, accounts of what value is and how it can be captured vary.  The ideas 
from each of these perspectives are summarized in Table 5 below. 
Table 5 Relevant ideas and authors in value creation 
Perspective Key ideas 
RBT - Value linked to utilization of resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993; 
Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000; Barney, 2001).   
- Two types of value: use value, “specific qualities of the product perceived by customers 
in relation to their needs” and exchange value, price (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000) 
Market- 
oriented 
- Emphasis on the importance of  relationships with other participants in the value chain, 
particularly active customers and lead users, in the process of value creation (Von Hippel, 
1986; Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004) 
Industrial - Value created within the firm (Porter, 1985) 
Accounting - “Net present value” sets out how future returns can be currently valued (Wong, 2002). 
  
The previous literature has highlighted the importance of the USO’s utilization of resources as well as the 
importance of its place in and active interaction within the value chain, so a combination of RBT and 
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market-oriented perspectives of value creation are appropriate.  The delivery of value to the next player in 
the chain, whether they are the final customer or not, depends on their perception of the unique 
characteristics of this product or process, which will impact whether they are willing to trade their resources 
for it. By this definition, revenue is one indicator of value to customer, as is access to other complementary 
assets, such as manufacturing capabilities, financing arrangements or access to customers. But before this 
stage, in many high-tech ventures, there is a requirement for investment or other necessary resources which 
contributes to the resource base of the company. Gaining investment and access to complementary 
resources involves perceptions of future value, and accessing resources from partners, co-producers or 
investors is directly dependent on either the future use value they perceive or the future exchange value they 
perceive.   
 
2.5.1 Entrepreneurial value creation 
 
The capacity of an entrepreneurial firm to create value is dependent on the firm’s ability to build and 
mobilize an appropriate resource base (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2003). Garnsey, Ford and Dee (2006), suggest 
a framework, Figure 4, which illustrates the spiral process of value creation and capture in entrepreneurial 
firms.   
 
Figure 4-The Entrepreneurial Process of Value Creation and Capture 
 
 
Source: (Garnsey et al, 2006, p9) 
 
This model shows the simplified development of a firm as it attempts to create, deliver and, ultimately, 
capture value.   
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From the concepts discussed in this review, a value creation conceptual framework is proposed which 
incorporates the key frameworks and ideas regarding the challenges facing AM USOs, their business 
models and value creation. 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Drawing on the literature, we aim to provide a framework that explains how the AM spin-outs create value, 
taking into consideration the particular challenges that they face, and how their business models and the 
evolution thereof reflect those challenges. The business model can be depicted at a point in time, in an open 
systems model, which clarifies their position in the firm’s value chain or web, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5-Example Elements of a Business Model 
 
 
 
This depiction of the business model will be used as a basis for tracing the evolution of business models as 
their environments and resources change.  
 
But as these spin-outs are subject to dynamic forces both internally and externally, they “progress through 
the continual interaction between shifting opportunities and emerging combinations of resources” (Druilhe 
and Garnsey, 2003). The framework proposed by Dee, Garnsey and Ford (2006), Figure 4, demonstrates the 
process of value creation and capture in entrepreneurial firms. This can be combined with the model 
proposed by Maine and Garnsey (2006), figure 2, which aimed to reveal the importance of the AM 
venture’s chosen value chain for its prospects. This model makes the crucial point that AM ventures must 
demonstrate value in a specific application before they can create value, as supported by case evidence.  
Firm 
Science Base  
Investors 
Co-Producers and 
distributors 
Manufacturers 
 
End 
Customers 
Arrows show flow of resources 
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However, this model places access to complementary assets and availability of finance after this point, 
where literature and preliminary case evidence suggest that these are more interrelated than they appear here, 
and do not necessarily occur in a certain order. Instead, the firm is likely to go through an iterative cycle in 
order build its resource base to the point where it can begin creating value. This model also does not 
emphasize the importance of relationships to the spin-out’s science base, investors and co-producers.  
 
The proposed framework, Figure 6, attempts to use an open systems’ perspective to enable the identification 
of the challenges and opportunities for new materials spin-outs as they attempt to create value.  
 
Figure 6-Proposed Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
This framework demonstrates that before an AM spin-out can create value, it must first go through a 
resource building cycle (1), often driven by the interrelationship between demonstrating value in a specific 
application and securing access to the complementary assets of co-producers. The arrows represent the flow 
of resources (IP, personnel, investment, knowledge, scale-up capabilities etc). Resources from the co-
producers, key drivers of the cycle, are traded for a share in promised future value. This works as a positive 
feedback loop, since the ability to attract partners has a positive effect on investment from other sources, 
often through the matching of funds.  This ‘resource building cycle’ continues until the resource base 
Business 
Idea 
Resource Base 
Create 
Value 
Demonstration of 
Value in Specific 
Application 
Co-producer  
(& complementary 
assets) 
(1) 
Resource 
Building Cycle 
(2) 
Science 
Base 
Value Capture
Next Cycle/Exit 
Outside Sources  
(Investment, Government, etc)  
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reaches the point where that value, in the form of revenues, can be generated (2). Most of the firms in the 
sample selected for this paper have not yet reached the stage of capturing value, so the cycle until value 
creation will be used to analyze the evidence.  
 
4. EVIDENCE 
 
Case studies are one method that can be used to explain, describe, illustrate, explore or meta-evaluate 
phenomena. This can incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data depending on the specific research 
questions and objectives. There is currently a lack of primary data concerning these spinouts, which further 
indicates that inductive methods of analysis, such as case studies, are suitable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2002). 
However, a larger dataset of AM companies related to the University of Cambridge is used to frame and 
select the case study to give a broader, more positivist perspective.   
4.1 AM Dataset 
A sample of 24 Cambridge associated companies was identified through university contacts and available 
databases. Although there are a greater number of AM companies connected to the university, it was not 
possible to identify all relevant companies from available databases, since most of these only provided 
information on department of origin, not on technology.5 The dataset was constructed primarily through 
secondary data from company websites, press releases and other databases.  Primary data was also gained 
from interviews by Dr Elicia Maine of Simon Fraser University and the author.6 It provides a more detailed 
picture of the environment in which these companies operate, stages of development, prevalent business 
models and challenges faced thus far. To concentrate on more market oriented traits and activities of these 
firms, the characteristics examined also include sources of finance, number of market areas targeted and 
strategic alliances.  
 
The companies have been divided by business model for analysis. Business models used were those 
identified in the literature: (1) manufacturing (including manufacturing with outsourcing and in-house 
manufacturing), (2) licensing and (3) combination.7 Many of the companies identified included a degree of 
development in their business models, but all of those were in connection with a current or future intention 
to include or shift into manufacturing or licensing.  For these reasons, ‘development’ is shown as a subset of 
combination models.  
                                                 
5 Duration of the investigation was constrained to one year 
6 This data is almost entirely from secondary sources so knowledge of internal constraints is limited.  Few firms specifically state 
their business model when providing evidence used as secondary information, so the business model for many of the companies 
has been inferred by the researcher and not necessarily discussed with the company. 
7 Of manufacturing, licensing and/or development 
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Table 6 provides a summary of the identified characteristics of the firms by business model. The sample 
shows that over half of the companies have a mixed business model, and that all but one have a strategy that 
depends on the involvement of partners. Table 7 then provides a summary of the challenges observed. Most 
have created a prototype, but only 16 of the 24 have demonstrated value in a specific application, which 
could mean a prototype with a specific application or gained access to assets of funds by demonstrating the 
value of the proposed product or process. 15 of the total 24 have begun generating some sort of revenue 
(through sales or R&D services). Only 7 have generated a profit, four of which are manufacturing firms.  
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Table 6-AM Dataset: Company Characteristics by Business Model 
 
Funding Business Model Companies Average 
Age 
(years) 
Average # 
Markets 
Areas8 
Strategy 
involves 
Alliances 
Currently 
has 
Alliances Self9 Government Angel Seed, VC or 
Corporate 
Funding 
Licensing 2 11.5 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 
Manufacturing10 8 21.4 2.9 7 7 5 1 0 5 
Mixed11 14 5.7 1.6 14 9 2 8 1 9 
Development 10 4.9 1.5 10 6 0 6 0 7 
Total Sample 24 11.4 2 23 16 8 9 3 15 
Case Companies 6 6 2.2 6 4 2 3 0 4 
 
Table 7-Business Models and Challenges Observed 
 
Business 
Model 
Strategy 
involves 
Alliances 
Avg. 
Access to 
Complem-
entary 
Asset12 
Has 
Prototype 
Demonstrated 
Value in 
Specific 
Application 
Created 
Value 
(Revenue) 
Captured 
Value 
(Profit) 
Process 
Innovations 
Required 
 
Needs 
Complementary 
Innovations 
 
Avg. Lack 
of 
Continuity/ 
Trialability13 
 
Avg. 
Upstream 
Position 
in Value 
Chain 
Has 
Established 
Substitutes 
 
Avg. Radical 
Technology14 
Licensing 2 2 2 2 2 015 1 0 1 1 2 1 
Manufacturing 8 1.5 8 7 6 4 216 4 1.1 1.13 8 1.4 
Mixed 14 1.2 11 7 7 3 317 6 1.3 1.7 12 1.8 
Development 10 1.1 7 3 3 0 218 4 1.4 1.7 8 1.8 
Total Sample 24 1.4 21 16 15 7 6 10 1.2 1.46 22 1.6 
Case Studies 6 1.33 4 4 4 0 2 2 1.2 1.7 5 1.7 
                                                 
8 Market areas are broadly defined, ie military, electronics, textiles, energy storage, drug delivery, etc.  
9 Generating profits which can be reinvested 
10 Includes in-house manufacturing and manufacturing with outsourcing 
11 11 include licensing their business model 
12 Scale from 0 to 2, 0 being no access, 1 being some access and 2 being access to significant resources (Maine, Lubik and Garnsey, 2008) 
13 Scale from 0-2, 0 being continuous from current technology, 1 being lack of continuity of the manufacturer or mainstream customer and 2 being difficult for both the 
manufacturer and the final consumer to directly trial the product before widespread release (Maine, Lubik and Garnsey, 2008) 
14 Scale from 0-2, 0 being incremental, 1 being significant improvement in performance attributes and novel technology, and 2 being potential for vast improvement in 
performance and highly novel technology (Maine, Lubik and Garnsey, 2008) 
15 One unknown 
16 One failed 
17 One failed 
18 One has gone out of business, one has not found alliances 
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As the database shows, there is a large degree of variation within the AM spin-out companies related to 
Cambridge.  For that reason, the companies selected for more in-depth case studies also have some degree 
of variety. As most of the companies in the sample have yet to capture value (17), neither have the selected 
companies.  Two spin-outs are second-generation19 and, for contrast, two are corporate spin-outs. Some of 
the key characteristics of the case companies are contrasted in Table 8.  
 
Table 8-Characteristics of Selected Case Companies 
 
Company Founding 
Year 
Business Model Needs 
Alliances? 
Has 
Alliances? 
Has 
Created 
Value? 
Has Captured Value? 
NanoMagnetics 1997 Mixed-Development 
and Licensing 
Yes No No No (failed) 
Apaclara 2006 Mixed-Development 
and Licensing 
Yes Yes Yes Pre 
Metalysis 2002 Mixed-Licensing and 
Manufacturing 
Yes Yes Yes Pre 
Atraverda 1992 Manufacturing Yes Yes Pre Pre 
AtraNova 2005 Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Pre 
Q-Flo 2004 Mixed-Development 
and Licensing 
Yes No Pre Pre 
 
4.2 Case Exemplars  
The following cases have been summarized and examined through the challenges they encountered, 
solutions attempted and the evolution of their business models in response to those challenges.  The 
conceptual framework has also been tested by mapping the critical challenges and solutions in their 
observed progression toward value creation.   Account of the business models, including market, customers 
and co-producers, are based on the perceived views of the firm at the time of case study because “the 
venture’s business model is a response to the entrepreneurs view of the environment and the opportunities it 
offers”(Garnsey, 2003). 
4.2.1 Case 1: NanoMagnetics20 
NanoMagnetics spun out of the University of Bath in 1997 to develop and commercialize the PhD work of 
Eric Mayes. This involved a nano-scale process of removing the iron from the protein Ferritin, an iron-
storage protein found in living organisms, and using the resulting cavity to producing a mold for uniform 
magnetic nanoparticles. Though there were a number of potential applications, data storage was chosen as 
the target market. Although the firm was able to access substantial venture capital in its early stages, market 
conditions and development challenges were major obstacles, leading to the downfall of the company.  The 
                                                 
19 Spin-outs which are one generation the company that spun out of the original parent entity 
20 This case is primarily an account of NanoMagnetics from the perspective of Dr Eric Mayes, company founder and CEO.  
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firm went into administration in January 2006, but not before the base was laid for a new company, 
Apaclara, using the technology in water purification applications. A summary of key challenges, solutions 
and the observed evolution of the firm’s business model thus far has been depicted in Table 9 and it journey 
toward value creation was been mapped on the conceptual framework in Figure 7. 
Table 9-Evolution of NanoMagnetics Business Model to Navigate Challenges 
  
Business Model Challenges (Solutions) 
 
A- market selection (choice of 7 markets, 
including data storage) 
B- access to finance (Move to Cambridge, 
found group of investors) 
C- need for complementary assets (‘back-
scratching’ arrangements with Bristol)) 
D- appropriate personnel: hired experienced 
corporate CEO, poor match to a start-up 
E- need for process innovations to lay down 
material on disks 
F- inability to demonstrate value in specific 
application, no proof of concept 
A- market selection, need to find another 
application to generate revenue or get more 
funding 
B- access to finance: market downturn, 
investors becoming cautious 
C- need for complementary assets (some 
still through Bristol) 
D- appropriate personnel: experienced CEO 
E- circumvented by business model 
(Process innovation no longer required) 
F- inability to demonstrate value in specific 
application, still no proof of concept 
KEY CHANGE: Approached by US 
company Cascade for partnership 
A- market selection (water purification 
with partner assistance) 
B- access to finance (Partners have SBIR 
funding) 
C- need for complementary assets (changed 
business model to focus on: partner and 
science base) 
D- appropriate personnel (change in focus 
did not require additional personnel) 
E- circumvented by business model (chose 
to produce whole  system) 
F- exit before value could be demonstrated 
NanoMagnetics 
Investors 
Cascade 
(US partner) 
End 
Customer 
#3: Development/Licensing (2005-2006) 
US Government 
NanoMagnetics 
Science Base 
(U of Bristol) 
Investors 
Pharmaceutical 
Incumbent 
(Glaxo)
End 
Customer
Flexible Media 
Incumbent 
(Japanese)
#2: Development/Licensing (2003-2005) 
End 
Customer
NanoMagnetics 
Investors 
#1: Development/Licensing (1997-2003) 
End 
Customer?
Science Base 
(U of Bristol) 
Science Base 
(U of Bristol) 
Distributor
Data Storage 
Incumbent? 
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Figure 7-Case 1 Value Creation Cycle 
 
 
 
  
 
4.2.2 Case 1b: Apaclara21 
Apaclara rose from the ashes of NanoMagnetics, in January of 2006, using the SBIR grant awarded to their 
partner, Cascade, to develop and commercialize some of NanoMagnetics’ technology in a water purification 
application. Cascade, a US-based sporting goods company, had come into contact with NanoMagnetics just 
before the company went into administration, and were enthusiastic to continue working with the 
technology and Dr Mayes. This access to patient complementary assets and funding has helped Apaclara 
produce a prototype and avoid many of the obstacles that faced its predecessor. The improved 
entrepreneurship knowledge of Dr Mayes and assistance of its partners was incorporated into its business 
model, as summarized in Table 10. This has allowed it to progress further through the resource building 
cycle, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 This case study is based on a number of interviews with Dr Mayes, company founder and non-executive unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 10-Apaclara’s Business Model 
 
Business Model Challenges (Solutions) 
 A- market selection (direction of partner) 
B- access to finance  (Received SBIR 
through Cascade )  
C- need for complementary assets 
(circumvented by partner-focused business  
model: partner and science base) 
D- appropriate personnel, (partner-focused 
business model also gave access to partner 
scientists) 
E- process innovations required, (produce 
entire system) 
F- demonstrated value in specific 
application (with access to complementary 
assets/ partner input) 
G- value creation (treated as subcontractor 
by Cascade) 
 
Figure 8-Case 1b Value Creation Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
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B- access to finance, 
circumvented by partners 
C- need for 
complementary assets 
D- appropriate personnel 
E- process innovations 
required 
F- demonstration of value 
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- -  path to value         
capture 
Business 
Idea 
Resource Base 
Create 
Value 
Demonstration of 
Value in Specific 
Application 
Co-producer  
(& complementary 
assets) 
(1) 
Resource 
Building Cycle 
(2) 
U of 
Bath 
Value Capture
Next Cycle/Exit 
A 
B C C E F 
D
C
G
Apaclara 
Science Base 
(U of Bath) US Government/military 
UK Government 
Cascade 
End Customer 
Distributor 
Development/Licensing (2006-present) 
Outside Sources 
(Investment, Government, etc) 
  19
4.2.3 Case 2: Metalysis 
 
Metalysis (FFC Ltd until 2003) was spun out of Cambridge University to commercialize the Cambridge 
Fray, Fathering and Chen FFC Process developed by Cambridge researchers by those names (Process 
Engineering, 2003). This process uses molten salt electrolysis to convert titanium dioxide directly into 
titanium, a previously complicated and expensive process. Fray approached Cambridge Enterprise Ltd, the 
University technology transfer office (TTO), to patent the process. Peter Hiscocks22 explains that the TTO 
did not have the resources to handle the licensing so it licensed the process to the Defense Evaluation and 
Research Agency (DERA), which in 2001 split into the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory and 
QinetiQ. QinetiQ would handle any further licensing of the FFC process. FFC Ltd then acquired the 
worldwide rights to the process for all metals, except titanium, the rights for which were licensed to British 
Titanium (BTi), another of Dr. Fray’s companies (2007).  
 
Metalysis received a great deal of government and VC finance and attracted a number of major industrial 
partners. Still, titanium was the most attractive metal identified because its processing costs could be 
reduced by the most significant ratio, and those rights had been licensed to BTi.  However, agents of the 
University were of the view that BTi was not effectively commercializing the process and chose to retract 
the license.23 In April 2005, Metalysis acquired the head license rights to the process from the University, 
giving the company the worldwide rights to all metal and alloys (Metalysis, 2007). BTi has brought legal 
action against Metalysis and QinetiQ, and a legal battle continues to this day (Fountain, 2007).  
 
As regards to the particular challenges Metalysis faced, namely those related to IP, the university’s TTO 
was central as both cause and the solution. The evolution of Metalysis’ business model in response to the 
key challenges faced and methods to circumvent those challenges is summarized in Table 11. This also 
shows the importance of appropriate partners and their complementary resources in navigating the resource 
building cycle. The case company’s journey through this cycle, and its progression through the conceptual 
framework, is also shown in Figure 9. 
                                                 
22 Mr Peter Hiscocks was involved in Cambridge Enterprise when Metalysis received its original funding and assisted in the 
selection of Dr Cooley as CEO. He also worked for Generics, a major investor in British Titanium (BTi), when BTi was 
attempting to commercialize the FFC Process. 
23 Hiscocks interview, ibid 
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Table 11-Evolution of Metalysis’ Business Model to Navigate Challenges 
 
Business Model Challenges (Solutions) 
A- market selection (began with 
founder knowledge/research focus 
that made market selection clear) 
B- demonstration of value in 
specific application (Value of 
process a major breakthrough which 
drew investors) 
C- access to complementary 
resources (IP) (through TTO 
licensing from University) 
C- access to complementary 
resources (adapted business model: 
selected part of value chain where 
smaller quantities were  needed) 
D- appropriate Personnel: CEO 
(circumvented through business 
model. Close ties with TTO allowed 
them to help with appointment of 
appropriate CEO) 
C- access to resources (IP) (still 
through relationship with TTO) 
E- access to complementary assets: 
Scale-up capabilities and market 
access (circumvented by business 
model: focused on strategic 
partnerships) 
F- value creation (through joint 
ventures with partners) 
 
 
 
Science Base 
(U. of Cambridge) 
Metalysis 
Rolls Royce 
(Tantalum) 
BHP Billiton 
(Titanium) 
Phone/ 
Electronic 
Manufacturer
Distributors 
End 
customers 
Distributors 
End 
customers 
Damaged 
#2: Licensing and Manufacturing (2006-present) 
Customers for high value 
metal and alloy powders 
Science Base 
(U. of Cambridge) 
Metalysis Phone/ Electronic 
Manufacturer End 
customers 
Distributors
#1: Manufacturing (2001-2006)
Funding  
(Government & VC) 
Funding 
(Government & VC) 
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Figure 9-Case 2 Value Creation Cycle 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Case 3: Atraverda24 
 
In the 1980s, while working at IMI Marston, Peter Hayfield invented Ebonex®, a titanium-oxide ceramic 
with a number of potential applications, including electro-chlorination, hydro-chlorate electrolyis, 
electrolytic water purification and lightweight batteries (Hayfield, 2002). But Ebonex®’s many applications 
were outside the remit of the company, so the IPR passed through a number of firms before Atraverda was 
founded in 1992, with the acquisition of the IPR and the files of Ebonex® Technologies Inc. Atraverda was 
subsequently purchased by Sagentia (Generics until 2006), who injected funding and personnel until 2004 
when they began to seek additional external investment for the company. Atraverda is focused on using 
their Ebonex® ceramic in bi-polar, lead-acid battery technologies, particularly high performance 
applications such as uninterruptible power supply (UPS). According to Andrew Dixey, CEO of Atraverda, a 
working bipolar battery is seen as the “holy grail”of the battery industry, as it solves a number of significant 
issues, such as durability, battery-life and performance.  
 
                                                 
24 This case study is based on an interview with Mr. Andrew Dixey, CEO of Atraverda, on August 30, 2007 unless otherwise 
cited. 
Key 
A- market selection  
B- demonstration of value 
in specific application 
C- access to 
complementary resources  
D- appropriate Personnel 
E- access to 
complementary assets 
F- value creation  
→  progression to date 
- -  path to value capture Business 
Idea 
Resource Base 
Create 
Value 
Demonstration of 
Value in Specific 
Application 
Co-producer  
(& complementary 
assets) 
(1) 
Resource 
Building Cycle 
(2) 
U. of 
Cambridge 
Value Capture
Next Cycle/Exit 
A B 
C 
C 
D 
D E
F 
Outside Sources 
(Investment, Government, etc) 
  22
This potentially revolutionary technology attracted significant venture capital funding as well as a number 
of the key partnerships that Atraverda was seeking. From the start, Atraverda was not going to be a battery 
producer. Instead, it would manufacture the Ebonex® powder and the substrates used in the batteries, both 
of which are covered by patents. Dixey explains that they would work with a number of global battery 
partners to assist in building the substrates with the Ebonex® material into a bi-polar battery which will be 
produced by the partners, not Atraverda. They felt that they could also leverage existing sales and 
distribution channels through those partners, which would provide Atraverda with faster access to high 
growth opportunities and significantly reduce capital requirements. 
 
Having spun out of and acquired by a number corporations before Sagentia, Atraverda’s Ebonex® 
technology spent years in development before its corporate parent realized the technology’s potential in 
battery applications. Table 12 summarizes the challenges faced by the company through its history, the 
solutions that were found and the evolution of Atraverda’s business model. This demonstrates the 
importance of access to finance through their parent and, later, outside investors. It also shows the 
importance of the business model in identifying the most appropriate partners and position in value chain 
for successful navigation of the resource building cycle before value creation, as shown in Figure 10.  
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Table 12-Evolution of Atraverda’s Business Model to Navigate Challenges 
 
Business Model Challenges (Solutions) 
 
A- mismatch with parent market/ 
competencies 
B- access to finance, (had one round of 
VC funding before being purchased by 
Generics (parent) which acted as an 
incubator) 
 
 
C- appropriate personnel: CEO 
(circumvented by business model/ 
parent involvement. CEO was selected 
from existing personnel to further 
development) 
D- market selection (parent 
involvement) 
E- demonstrate value in a specific 
application (no prototype but continued 
development funded by parent) 
 
 
C- appropriate personnel (CEO 
becomes CTO to continue 
development, new CEO selected in 
2007 for experience in raising 
funding) 
F- access to complementary assets 
(circumvented through business 
model: selection of innovative leaders 
as partners for  manufacturing, scale-
up and market access) 
 
 
Parent 
(Sagentia) 
Leading 
Manufacturers
 
#2: Development/Manufacturing (2002-2004)
End 
Customer
Atraverda 
Investors 
(VCs) 
Battery Market? 
Parent 
(Sagentia) 
Investors 
(Parent, VC, 
Gov’t) 
Leading 
Manufacturer 2
(TBS)
Leading 
Manufacturer 3 
(Exide) 
#3: Manufacturing (2004-present) 
Leading 
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End 
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Figure 10-Case 3 Value Creation Cycle 
 
 
 
 
4.2.5 Case 3b: AtraNova25 
 
In 2005, AtraNova spun out of Atraverda. In the beginning, AtraNova was, according to their technical 
manager Paul Wilkins, a “backroom research team” within Atraverda, investigating the material and its 
properties further, with a focus on water purification and waste treatment. Although AtraNova were not 
originally a profitable group, Sagentia AG, who had an 80% investment in the Atraverda through their 
private equity arm, pushed for AtraNova to be spun out and produce a profitable product.  The change was 
facilitated by the appointment of a new CEO, Alex Simpson, whose view was that the new company either 
needed to be made profitable or closed.  
 
A significant, though unexpected, deal in with a company in Israel drove the company to complete design, 
prove and deliver a large number of their electro-coagulation devices in a very short period. These devices, 
which use the Ebnoex ceramic to charge and remove pollutants from waste water, were delivered for a 
                                                 
25 This case study is based on interviews with Technical Manager Paul Wilkins in Autumn of 2006 and August 2007 unless 
otherwise cited.  
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specific amount, but further deals were made with a different revenue model. Instead of a lump sum, 
AtraNova receive a percentage of money the partner company saves on fees charged by the government for 
dumping waste.  As their technology is still being refined, their clients also act as development partners. 
They also assist their clients to find ways to dispose of the resulting filtrates, such as selling it to bio-fuel 
companies.  This complete solution allows them to facilitate product trial and adoption, which has also led 
to a number of referrals to new clients.   
As a second-generation spin-out from Atraverda, AtraNova was strongly directed by the parent of its parent, 
circumventing the challenges of market selection, personnel selection and access to finance. They have 
adopted a customer-centric business model, shown in Table 13, which allows them to continually test and 
improve their technology while beginning to generate revenue. They have also progressed further through 
the conceptual framework, as shown in Figure 11.  
Table 13-AtraNova’s Business Model 
 
Business Model Challenges (Solutions) 
A- market selection (through focused 
business model and with parent 
involvement) 
B- access to finance (focused business 
model with parent involvement) 
C- appropriate personnel (focused 
business model with parent involvement 
to select  CEO with profit focus ) 
D- access to complementary assets 
(focused business model identified co-
producers and customers) 
E- demonstrate value in a specific 
application (customer-focused business 
model to encourage product trial) 
F- value Creation (Business model and 
serendipity of deal with Israeli company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AtraNova 
Out-sourced 
manufacturers 
Parent/Investor 
(Sagentia) 
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Figure 11-Case 3b Value Creation Cyclex 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.6 Case 4: Q-Flo26 
 
Q-Flo was founded in 2004 by Dr Martin Pick and Dr Alan Windle in order to separate the 
commercialization/entrepreneurship that arose in Dr Windle's research group from the research going on 
within it. Q-Flo currently has status as an ‘embedded company’ in the university as well as a ‘pipeline’ 
agreement with the Carbon Nanotube Research Group (Pick, 2007). Although there were a number of 
inventions that the new company felt had potential, the technology they have pursued is a novel process for 
producing carbon-nanotube (CNT) fibre.  If the technology can be successfully scaled-up, Dr Pick believes 
it may be capable of producing some of the strongest material on earth. 
 
The first challenge the company faced was gaining access to the required IP. The two licenses related to the 
process were held by Thomas Swan & Co. Ltd, who funded the research that produced them. The first 
                                                 
26 Unless otherwise stated, this case is based on multiple interviews between Dr Pick and the author in summer 2006 and autumn 
of 2007, as well as an interview between Dr Pick and Dr. EW Garnsey in summer 2006.  
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twelve months of Q-Flo’s existence was spent negotiating with Thomas Swan Ltd over their rights to the 
license. Although the standard university agreement gave Thomas Swan Ltd rights to the IP, the two parties 
were able to reach an agreement that satisfied them both. Thomas Swan, the individual, decided that 
although his company had put a great deal of money into the research, they had also got a process out of it 
which worked well. Dr Pick realized that this outcome “hinged around [their] relationship to Tom Swan.”  
 
Despite the potential value of this process in a variety of applications and markets, the company has yet to 
attract the capital or partnership necessary for scale-up trials. However, the university department has 
received a £1.2M EPSRC grant to investigate the fundamental technology.  Dr Pick suggests that a lack of 
focus by the management, who all have other employment, along with technological uncertainty are serious 
challenges to the company. At this point, Pick is considering turning his attention to one of Q-flo’s other 
patents in order to shift the company’s focus and perhaps begin generating revenues.  
  
Q-Flo’s current challenges, shown in Table 14, align with the literature suggesting that a single market 
focus is useful to a business with a radical, generic technology (Maine and Garnsey, 2004). It also 
demonstrates the interconnected nature of access to complementary assets through partners and 
demonstration of value in a specific application, as shown in Figure 12, which can cause a hazardous 
situation for a young firm.  
 
Table 14-Q-Flo’s Business Model 
 
Business Model Challenges (Solutions) 
A- access to IP (entrepreneurs’ 
relationship with IP holder) 
B- access to finance (through 
relationship with university 
department) 
C- market selection (ongoing as no 
market as been selected) 
D- appropriate personnel (on-going but 
partially solved by personnel. Current 
board members are experienced, well-
connected and methodical, but not not 
soley focused on Q-Flo) 
E and F- access to complementary 
assets and demonstration of value in 
specific application. Not yet solved, 
interconnected and on-going) 
 
 
Q-Flo 
Science Base  
(U of Cambridge) 
Investors 
Co-Producers and 
distributors 
Manufacturers of 
products based on high 
performance fibre
Development/Licensing (2005-present) 
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Figure 12-Case 4 Value Creation Cycle 
 
 
 
4.3 Cross-case Analysis 
An analysis of the companies in both the database and the case studies shows a wide variety of growth 
patterns, business models, challenges and solutions.  To further compare the case companies, their growth 
patterns are discussed, followed by the dominant challenges that have emerged. 
 
4.3.1 Company growth figures 
A comparison of the case companies’ growth figures, in Figures 13, 14 and 15, demonstrates great diversity.  
This is typical of firms in an emerging technology sector, which tend to generate a great variety of designs 
and practices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13-Cross-case Growth Figures: Cumulative Patents 
Key 
A- access to IP 
B- access to finance 
(research funds through 
university) 
C- market selection 
(ongoing) 
D- appropriate personnel 
E- access to 
complementary assets 
F- demonstration of value 
in specific application 
→  progression to date 
      remaining Path 
- -  path to value capture 
Business 
Idea 
Resource Base 
Create 
Value 
Demonstration of 
Value in Specific 
Application 
Co-producer  
(& complementary 
assets) 
Resource 
Building Cycle 
(2) 
University of 
Cambridge  
Outside Sources 
(VC, Gov’t) 
Value Capture
Next Cycle/Exit 
D E F 
A 
B 
(1) 
 
C D 
E F 
  29
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Nanomagnetics (D,L)
Apaclara (D,L)
Metalysis (L)
Atraverda (M)
AtraNova(M)
Q-Flo (D,L)
 
Figure 14-Cross-case Growth Figures: Employees 
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Figure 15-Cross-case Growth Figures: Investment Funds 
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*Note: No funding information available on AtraNova 
 
Although business model, funding, employment and patents are useful indicators of the evolution of 
individual companies, there do not appear to be general trends within the sample, except that all firms are 
engaged in trial and error searching for their most appropriate market, route to that market, and/or 
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application. There is considerable variety and chance affecting when and which challenges appear. 
Company performance, in both short and long term, is influenced by complex internal and external factors: 
complex environmental factors such as current market trends and timing. Some notable internal factors are 
entrepreneurial ingenuity and making creative and/or efficient use of scare resources.  Despite disparate 
growth patterns, several dominant challenges and solutions have emerged.  
 
4.3.2  Dominant challenges and solutions 
 
The dominant business models, challenges and solutions from the case studies are summarized in table 15.  
These include market selection, access to finance, selection and appointment of appropriate personnel, 
process innovations, demonstration of value in a specific application, access to complementary assets and 
value creation, generally through focus of their business model on the customer.  Many of the challenges the 
companies have encountered are not so much solved by their business model as circumvented by the 
evolution of that business model.  
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Table 15-Dominant Challenges and Solutions in Case Exemplars 
   Challenges and Solutions 
Company # 
Business 
models 
Current/Last 
business model 
Market 
selection 
Access to 
finance 
Appropriate 
personnel 
Process 
Innovations 
Required 
Demonstration 
of value in 
specific 
application 
Access to 
complementary 
assets 
 
Value 
Creation 
Nano-
Magnetics 
3 Mixed-
Development 
and Licensing 
Business model 
3: partner 
focused 
Before 
demonstration 
of value in 
specific 
application 
Business 
model 3: 
partner 
focused 
Business 
model 2: 
change 
position in 
value chain 
Not solved Business model 
3: partner 
focused 
N/A 
Apaclara 1 Mixed-
Development 
and Licensing 
Partner-
focused 
business model 
Partner-
focused 
business model 
Partner-
focused 
business model 
Produced 
system 
Partner-focused 
business model 
and links to 
science base 
Partner-focused 
business model 
and links to 
science base 
N/A 
Metalysis 2 Licensing Founder 
knowledge/ 
research focus 
Business model 
1 &2: Clear 
application 
and market 
identification 
Involvement by 
TTO 
N/A While still in U 
of Cambridge 
(IP) Hindered by 
capability of 
TTO then helped 
by TTO 
(scale-up) 
business model 
1&2: partner 
focused 
 
N/A 
 
Atraverda 3 Manufacturing Business 
Models 2 & 3: 
Parent 
assistance in 
selection 
Business 
models 1,2 & 
3: parent 
involvement 
then investors 
Business 
models 2&3: 
parent 
involvement/cu
rrent 
personnel 
N/A Business model 2 
& 3: 
development and 
partner 
involvement 
Business models 
2&3: partner 
focused 
N/A 
AtraNova 1 Manufacturing Parent 
involvement/ 
Customer-
focused 
business model 
Parent 
involvement 
Parent 
involvement 
N/A Customer-
focused business 
model 
Identified in 
business model 
Business 
model 1: 
Customer 
focused 
Q-Flo 1 Mixed-
Development 
and Licensing 
On-going On-going but 
development 
costs covered 
through 
university 
on-going but 
partially 
addressed by 
personnel 
On-going 
(scale-up 
process 
required 
On-going (IP) solved by 
personnel 
(scale-up) on-
going 
N/A 
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Business model: Combination licensing and development business models appear to be the most dominant 
business models among USOs which appears to demonstrate the necessity of a more partner focused 
approach to the technology and market. Corporate spin-outs have the financial support and access to 
complementary assets necessary to adopt a manufacturing model, though theirs are still very partner-
focused.  The second generation spin-outs have experienced less evolution in their business models. It 
appears that learning has occurred in the first-generation spin-out beforehand. This allows the second-
generation spin-out to acquire know-how, information and strategy from their parents, as well as assistance, 
access to resources and access to markets.  
 
Market selection: The corporate spin-outs showed the most variation in position/timing of market selection.  
Atraverda did not select a market until they had already demonstrated value, while AtraNova, with the 
assistance of Sagentia, had a market at inception, as did Apaclara. The academic spin-outs also faced the 
same challenge, as many identified a number of possible markets and then benefited from outside 
involvement, such as research grants or co-producer involvement to choose a focus. This shows that market 
selection remains a prevalent issue for USOs. 
 
Access to finance: Analysis shows that both where access to finance becomes a challenge and how it is 
overcome varies greatly by company. Some companies have managed to access finance even before 
demonstrating value in specific applications through their parent firms, science bases or even investors.  The 
promised value of their intended innovation appeared to be sufficient. Q-Flo faces the double bind of 
needing finance to demonstrate value in a specific application and not being able to attract investment 
before doing so. 
 
Personnel Selection: All of the spin-outs have required appropriate personnel to take their technology 
forward, but when and how these people are found was very situation dependent. In many circumstances, 
the skills and relationships of the entrepreneurs are valuable but in other situations, especially later in the 
company’s development, additional and/or more professional skills and experience are usually required. 
Partner involvement can help, as can the TTO or the parent, allowing the spin-outs to benefit from their 
academic or corporate roots.  
 
Complementary Process Innovations: Most of the overall sample and case study companies did not require 
process innovations, but those case studies that did either had significant challenges to find access to 
  33
partners and/or finance. Successful solutions involved changes in the business model such as place in value 
chain or change in product, such as offering a complete system instead of just a material or component. 
 
Demonstration of value in a specific application: This was shown to be critical before the resource building 
cycle could be completed. In some cases, the USOs’ links to the science base either through research grants 
or continuing involvement overcame or decreased the challenge. However, a partner-focused business 
model appears to be a more useful in the typical interdependent and interactive value chain of an AM 
venture.  As AtraNova focuses on their customer while refining their technology on existing sites, their 
customers act as development partners, therefore their business model can also be seen as partner-focused.  
 
Access to complementary assets: As stated in the literature, USOs experience many challenges because of 
their origin, such as the capabilities of the TTO. In the case of Metalysis, the TTO was both a hindrance and 
asset, licensing the key patents to someone else, initially keeping Metalysis from accessing a potentially 
lucrative market. However, the TTO was also able to assist them in eventually getting it back. Q-Flo also 
experienced the challenge of getting the required IP from Thomas Swan Ltd, which they circumvented 
through their personal relationship to Thomas Swan the individual.  
 
Companies that were successful at accessing complementary assets such as facilities, capabilities, finance 
and market, tended to adopt a partner-focused business model, working closely with their partner both 
before and after demonstrating value in a specific application.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
AM USOs face a number of challenges in their complex market and technological environment, most 
notably market selection, access to finance, appropriate personnel, required complementary process 
innovations, access to complementary assets and need to demonstrate value in a specific application. In 
particular, academic spin-outs, especially those with more generic technologies, have considerable difficulty 
in selecting a market and/or application, increasing the difficultly of attracting finance and appropriate 
partners. Without these, demonstration of value or potential future value in a specific application is unlikely, 
inhibiting the company’s ability to build sufficient resource base with which to create value. Corporate and 
second generation spin-outs faced these challenges to a lesser extent, having had their predecessors navigate 
many of the challenges, including market selection (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005).  
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Although the case companies presented have attempted to circumvent these challenges through a number of 
business models, no particular type of business model, such as manufacturing, licensing or development, 
was shown to be more effective at creating value than others. However, the business models that are most 
successful at lowering the considerable risks of AM commercialization and value creation appear to be 
those that focus on identifying the most appropriate position in the value network as well as key partners 
and relationships. The involvement of these partners often also shapes the creation and evolution of the 
start-up’s business model. In addition to partner identification and focus, an effective business model 
enables the new firm to identify and choose its appropriate position in the value chain and leverage both 
internal and external resources in creative ways to build a sufficient and appropriate resource base.  
5.1 Implications for Theory 
 
The review of the relevant literature showed a need for a means to identify and address typical challenges 
AM USOs face while attempting to commercialize their innovations. For this purpose, the conceptual 
framework in Figure 16 has been proposed and refined.  
Figure 16-Refined Conceptual Framework 
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found in the literature. As expected and indicated in the literature, demonstration of value in a specific 
application must occur before revenues are achieved through value creation, but the findings of this study 
suggest this does not necessarily occur before access to finance or access to complementary assets. Indeed, 
it is usually the access to complementary assets that allow for the market access and scale-up necessary to 
reach a level in the resource-building cycle where revenue can begin being generated. As expected, the 
close links to the parent entity and their complementary assets, including experience and technological 
resources, is beneficial to spin-outs before partnering activity has been necessary and/or possible.  But it 
must be noted that lack of an experienced or well-resourced university TTO can be detrimental to spin-outs.  
 
This work also offers some refinements to prior knowledge which inform our understanding on AM USOs. 
Building on previous value creation models identified (Garnsey, Dee et al., 2006; Maine and Garnsey, 
2006), I propose that (1) a critical resource-building cycle occurs before value creation. (2) In this cycle, 
there is a complex interrelationship between the firm, parent institution, and co-
producers/partners/customers as part of the effort to demonstrate the value of the technology of value in a 
specific application. A variant of this finding is found in Garnsey 2003 on biopharmaceutical ventures. 
Previous models and literature show the importance of resource acquisition and exploitation in 
entrepreneurial ventures (Penrose, 1997; Garnsey, 1998); however, this research highlights that one of the 
most crucial resources for AM USOs to acquire and exploit appears to be market knowledge. A small 
amount of this may be present at inception, but during the resource-building cycle market knowledge can be 
acquired and refined through interactions with the environment, partners and potential partners, and through 
trial and error. This knowledge can then be used to refine and evolve the firm’s business model. In the case 
of second-generation and corporate spin-outs, much of this is provided by the parent entity. 
 
As a refinement to Maine and Garnsey’s 2006 model, demonstration of value in a specific application does 
always not have to occur before access to complementary assets. In some cases, prospects of a share in 
potential future value have been sufficient to attract partners or co-producers. In other cases, the 
complementary assets gained through relationships with the parent entity have been used to demonstrate 
potential value. This also emphasizes the importance of outside parties in AM commercialization from spin-
outs. 
6.2 Implications for Practice 
 
This research has produced a number of insights which can be of use to entrepreneur-scientists and 
managers.  When creating or refining their business model, a partner-focused business model appears to be 
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the most appropriate for AM USOs, as shown by the case studies. This should also aid market selection, a 
prevalent challenge, as an appropriate business model includes a view of the entire value chain including 
partners, competitors and most viable point of market entry in each potential market. This should also aid 
access to finance because an identified market allows an early-stage spin-out to direct their exploration 
toward demonstration of value in a specific application, helping to attract investor finance before 
demonstration and partner investment after. 
 
The need for complementary process innovations appears to pose one of the greatest challenges to the 
demonstration of value in a specific application and the coinciding attraction of co-producers/partners.  This 
has been circumvented in two ways: either by being able to demonstrate the technology in a system or with 
the use of business model to select an alternative market or market position for which complementary assets 
are available.   
 
Finally, the selection of key personnel has been shown to be a pervasive challenge to AM USOs, which can 
affect their ability to navigate other crucial challenges. The knowledge, connections and experience of the 
parent firm or university technology transfer office can and should be exploited for choosing appropriate 
personnel. However, the entrepreneurs’ own unique skill set and experience through the birth of the 
technology can be useful in leveraging or developing relationships with key parties. But as the company 
approaches commercialization, its CEO will generally need to concentrate more on partnership management 
and post-seed fundraising instead of leading technological exploration or advancement. At that point, the 
first CEO, usually the entrepreneur, may operate more effectively as the CTO. 
6.3 Implication for Policy 
The experiences of these spin-outs demonstrate that a valuable technology offered by an innovative 
company will not always be selected by the market due to complex challenges, both internal and external, 
such as managerial experience within the venture or market evolution factors. Policy makers may be able to 
assist in a number of ways, which include providing support for the development of market assessment 
techniques, supporting and encouraging business training for scientist-entrepreneurs, providing incentives 
for incumbent firms to form partnerships with spin-outs and providing support and/or setting standards for 
technology transfer offices in IP management and personnel selection.  
6.4 Limitations 
As stated in section 4, the focus of this research was on understanding and explaining the challenges facing 
university spin-outs in the emerging industry of advanced materials technologies.  Although the case studies 
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used were selected to be illustrative of typical challenges, the database used to position them was not 
exhaustive. For this reason, these case studies were not necessarily representative.  Instead, they provide a 
basis for the creation and refinement of theory and conceptual framework, and insight into the challenges 
facing AM USOs and potential solutions. Although the theory must be tested through further case 
replication in order to show it can be generalized, it seems likely that challenges, issues and solutions 
similar to those that have occurred among the sample companies will be found in other companies, clusters 
or industries involving generic technologies and relatively high capital costs for development and 
commercialization.  
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